The author uses Manzhouli materials to analyse the role of frontier urbanization in the mass reflection as regards Chinese migration and China's role in the region. The analysis is based on two series of semi-formalized interviews (in 2013 and 2014) with city residents and tourists from Russia and China. The article shows that the success of cooperation in Siberian regions at the new stage of development requires reconsidering the existing mythologemes of the postSoviet consciousness, i.e. spatial (periphery is dependent on the centre), border (protection from Chinese migrants is needed) and economic (reliable cooperation is impossible) mythologemes.
border localization had to include the practice of "our appropriation of China" in the general tendency to feel the Chinese presence in the region, therefore this trend is of interest not only for the research on Chinese-style frontier urbanization, but also for entwinement of projections about and experience in complicated relations between the host society and Chinese migrants.
The main topic of the article includes explicit and implicit views of Russian crossborder entrepreneurs on how an Asian trade city, which is convenient for business and leisure purposes, should look like. According to Russian respondents, the criteria for the border trade city, which is convenient for business and leisure are obvious: for advantageous trading there should be a combination of relative safety, low prices for goods and a critical mass of Russian-speaking entrepreneurs. Not everything is as simple as it seems at first glance though. The border Chinese city Manzhouli is the embodiment of all these needs. Intended for trade with Russian businessmen, this city of economic cooperation and friendship is fully focused on guests from Russia. In addition to economic opportunities, the city offers the possibility of inexpensive rest in super modern conditions, which is especially critical for the East Transbaikalia, which undergoes economic and social decline. Despite this, comfort and credibility are the last things the guests from Russia think about. Manzhouli has a bad reputation for being the space of deception, aggression and greed of Chinese entrepreneurs. The city is perceived as an elaborate cover, concealing the true image of China as twofaced, incomprehensible and dangerous. No Chinese city in Russia did cause as many complex emotions as Manzhouli; this city is the leader in terms of emotional and heated discussions.
Because of Manzhouli's accessibility and near border location, the dramatic representation of its perception was automatically projected on the neighbouring Siberian cities, negatively marking the "Chinese areas" and the imagined economic potential of the diaspora. Why was the city (which did everything possible to fulfill the requirements of Russian entrepreneurs) perceived as an anti-place, producing only fraud and violence? What unexpressed expectations of Russian entrepreneurs turned out to be decisive for a negative evaluation of the city? To be answered, these questions have to be studied through the attitude of Russians towards Chinese merchants and also taking into account the very urban space of life and commerce, which initiates feelings of danger and distrust among Russian tourists. As will be shown, the projections of the city as a dangerous place can generate the distrust regardless of the city authorities' policy or the behaviour of its residents. In 1949, the USSR turned from a challenging neighbour into a cultural, financial, and technological donor, while confirming Chinese concerns about the priority of geopolitical 1 It should be noted that these measures had minor effectiveness due to the weakness of the administrative apparatus and the immediate economic interest of the Cossacks (responsible for border security) in the Chinese environment. Despite this, the introduction of a biopolitical vocabulary and practices (demanded during the Soviet era) was very important.
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In many ways, not so consistent and dependent on political state of affairs.
interests over the internationalism ideology among Soviet communists. After the Twentieth Party Congress, relations between the countries had been deteriorating more and more under the influence of a complex of external and internal factors. The period of the Cultural Revolution became an apogee, during which the USSR finally adopted the image of the northern hegemon threatening the territorial integrity of the PRC (Tikhvin, 2008) . The militarization of border areas increased sharply (Fravel, 2005: 74) with the corresponding actualization of the mythologemes about the frontier disloyalty of Russian immigrants to China (Peshkov, 2012) . Meanwhile, there happened either spontaneous or controlled destruction of Russian heritage sites in the region, perceived as traces of the "century of humiliation". Thus, the frontier population underwent a tense emotional anticipation of a collision, reinforced by restrictions on the movement and the general policy of the socio-political sterility of frontier territories. General facts are widely known: these are the persecution of the Russian and Buryat diasporas, the destruction of the Russian architectural fund and the attempts to ruin the Soviet legacy completely.
In 1949-1986 there was a time for a synchronization of the "frontier socialism"
policy both in the USSR and the PRC. The mass migration from the centre and the spread of compulsory primary education in the socialist school marginalized the hybrid culture of the border regions and lengthened the cultural distance between the Russian and Chinese borders significantly. Newcomers with a completely different geographical imagination began to dominate in the region, gradually creating new forms of locality (Bille, 2009; Peshkov, 2014) . The opening of borders and the sharp increase in the mobility of the border population led to attempts to invent transboundariness and to redescribe border regions (bastions) in the categories of openness, hybridity and special connections. Unlike Russia, China was interested not only in trade, but also in turning the northeast into a zone of cultural hybridization and schooling, in using Russian cultural models adapted for the Chinese. The region with the experience of frontier socialism, mass migration and long-term isolation again looked for its cultural specificity by joining very diverse elements into a bizarre whole. This active cultural policy was largely aimed at the past, which in this context is a reservoir of symbols that improve the region's investment and tourist attractiveness. The new stage of the Chinese-Russian cooperation brought radical changes in the balance of power between the two countries: now it was not Russia which played a major role as an economic donor and investor, but dynamically developing China which pulled up the Siberian and Far Eastern regions to its orbit. In spite of significant benefits from the border demilitarization, Russian society was not ready for a drastic reversal of roles.
One of the Chinese respondents in Ergun City area explained to Ivan Basharov the difference between the Russians on both sides of the border by saying that the Chinese Russians are the Russians grown on the Chinese seeds (Basharov, 2009: 305) . There are several aspects we can find in common. First of all, these are spaces "not for the dwellers themselves", mostly subordinate to the market logic and the priorities of attracting tourists or investors (Bulag, 2010) . This is an absolutely artificial factory of authenticity intended to create commercial images of the friendly past and the happy present. The symbolic objects are piled on one another, creating the effect of an empty space out of time: hotels and Russian steam houses designed in the shape of Orthodox churches, fields decorated with huge Matryoshkas, enormous buildings intended to The relocation of the Evenki reindeer breeders to a specialized settlement of Aoluguya (suburbs of Genhe city in Inner Mongolia) is a very interesting example of re-Siberization policy of the Tungusic peoples of China. The re-Siberization policy is directly connected to the reproduction of Siberian heritage within the nation-building of the Tungusic nations of China. The main purpose of the relocation campaign was to cease nomadism as a backward socioeconomic practice. The relocation spot, Aoluguya settlement, bears a complicated conceptual load: a completely newly built village combines modern family cottages and official buildings in the "Evenki" architectural style. Consequently, the local community divided into the major (app. 190 people) group of Aoluguya residents and the minority of 30-40 attempting to stay in taiga, keeping quite a large herd of deer (700 heads) (Fraser, 2010) .
represent Evenki chums, copies of Soviet monuments accumulated in one spot turn the assigned Russian (or Siberian) space into a "non-place", created for a neo-liberal interpretation of Russian presence as an instrument of improving the investment attractiveness of the region and tourism development.
Secondly, they paradoxically break the connection to the Russian past of the region. It is explained by the two imperatives of the new cross-border reality: representation of cultural diversity and an emphasis on the frontier loyalty of the local population.
In this context, the popular ethnography and the official legend of the loyal Chinese border residents designed for tourists are strictly separated and hardly have anything in common. This is a way of avoiding the dilemmas connected to the post-colonial perspective of the Russian presence and concentrating on mutual enrichment. Still remaining a right choice story 1 , the past turns into a pool of symbols enhancing the investment and touristic attractiveness of the region. If we add the influence made on the administrative decision-making by the ethno-tourism market, it would be possible to say that the past turns out to be a hostage not only of the present, but also of the certain economic expectations of the future.
Manzhouli: from a railway workers' settlement to a global city imitation
Manchuria is the first station of the CER Right-of-Way. Through the major part of its history, it was a small settlement of Russian and Chinese railway workers, resembling more of a village than a town (Urbansky, 2012) . The main role-determining factor of the settlement was the border. Depending on the situation, the town was an outstation of the Russian colonial exploration of Manchuria, a Japanese border post, a place of vibrant exchange between the two socialist brother-nations, an important USSR economic assistance organization point or a fortress protecting the region from its Northern neighbour. A new age in the history of the town began on April 16, 1983,
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The standard role of the past in socialist societies (Zalejko, 1994) . (Bazarov, Ganzhurov, 2002: 59) .
Starting from Due to its location and size, Manzhouli is not a global city, but it is important that it is the only attempt to imitate such in the region. It determines both the appearance of the city, the specificity of its new dwellers and the cultural policy intended to emphasize the common (Socialist) past of the region. Its location, adjacent to the border, also determines the seasons of its function: in summer, the city represents Chinese Russia for Chinese tourists, and throughout the rest of the year, this is Russian China for the tourists from Russia. In this regard, Manzhouli acts as an intermediary for, at least, three parties: tourists from Russia (cheap shopping in a comfortable environment), tourists from China (real Russia), and the government (a city of intensive cross-border exchange).
All these strategies are interdependent: the absence of guests from Russia makes it difficult to sell the Russian exotics and creates a threat of a financial disaster, should the state get disappointed in this city of friendship and trust. The implementation of these strategies gets more and more complicated by the peripheric location of the neighbouring Siberian regions and the deepening economic problems of Russia, the appearance of new logistic models due to the access to the Western industrial goods (Urumchi-Bishkek-Irkutsk line) and the rapid development of e-trade with China. In this regard, the further fate of the city is directly related to the adjustment of the Chinese economy of expectation (causing the investment re-evaluation of the majority of projects) with the buying capacity of the Siberian periphery, greatly dependent on the gradually reducing subventions from the central budget.
The created urban space of trust and friendship combines the idea of a trading city, the Chinese image of a perfect Russian town and imitation of a global city. Unlike the infrastructure of the memory (Trekhrechie villages) or the factories of the authenticity (Aoluguya), focused on the perfect past with an idea of the future, this type of space symbolizes the future of the region as an important pole of cross-border development.
Manzhouli could not be better at symbolizing the new Chinese urbanism, combining the economy of expectation with the transformation of urban spaces into the places of materializing utopia and learning the new models of life, so typical of the Maoist China (Duafang Lu, 2006) . Bulag wrote about the urbanistic boom in the Inner Mongolia:
"Cities appear as centres for the industrial miracles and "actions" to happen pointing at the future utopia (…) and are presented by mass media as the picture of modernity (…) and its radically convincing images of a good life, progress and development" (Bulag, 2002: 212) .
As for Manzhouli, we deal with a more sophisticated form of an urban space, when In the same way, the collective memory of the Soviet population in socialist Mongolia was focused on a simulated political confrontation with the local Russian population, displacing real memories of work or military service (Peshkov, 2012) .
and modesty) become not only a dangerous manifestation of the insidious plan for economic expansion, but also a cause for dehumanization. In this way T. Holtslener writes about the demonization of Chinese migration in the first two decades of the reform, "Patriotic discourse dominates in the print media. The Chinese are shown as an amorphous mass, alike a moving swarm, ready to swallow helpless hosts, and are metaphorically compared to moving birds, locusts or cockroaches (...). In addition to this predator image, the Chinese are perceived as dangerous bodies that can spread infectious diseases among the Russian population (Holtslener, 2009: 108) .
Due to the subjective extraterritoriality of the city, these attitudes are in complex relations with the negative image of the Chinese in Manzhouli, complementing each other and creating false empirical evidence of xenophobic attitudes towards neighbours.
As a city-market, Manzhouli, in a sense, is a challenge to the post-Soviet periphery,
confronting Russian cultural hierarchies (West-East) with the challenge of economic asymmetry (China-Siberia). In the case of China, non-Soviet socialist modernity is not perceived by the post-Soviet consciousness, which is tied to the opposition of Western and Eastern (Soviet) modernity (Peshkov, 2010) . In this context, the existence of a supermodern city on the other side of the border is perceived not so much as the success of as the city-market with a "lack of culture", are equally confined in the geographical captivity of peripherality.
Distrust of the city-market has deeper roots and is largely connected with the overlapping of the idea of the city and the market in one space, which is largely alien to the Russian urban culture, subordinating the markets to the city in the form of fencing in a specific place or their removal beyond the city limits (Humphrey, Skvirskaya, 2009 ). Market space and places of border crossing are most often associated with disorder (Humphrey, 2010: 113) .
an emblem of unfamiliar and alien, which lurks for everyone who does not care about the boundaries of their community "in a patriotic way" (Trubina, 2010) .
In this perspective, disorder is the essence of the city-market, regardless of its appearance; it is immanent in place and in many respects is its derivative. It is the lack of order that turns anxiety into a basic distrust of the city -the market for cheap goods as an alternative to the post-Soviet city.
The problem of reputation in an antagonistic cultural environment
Let us try to sort through the mechanisms of deception in the city. A trap of distrust was a problem of the city from the moment it became a cross-border market town. The goal of the city was to solve problems with trust: an adapted symbolic field, the spread of the Russian language and the possibility to pay in roubles should create a comfortable environment for business and leisure. But, as it was said at the beginning of the article, Most of these problems are typical of every post-socialist trading platform or overseas trip to a cheap Asian resort. In the first case, the lack of procedures, common standards and quality control allows for a simultaneously rapid decline in prices and gives rise to risks of poor-quality purchases. In the second case, the consent of the state for indulgences for foreigners (informal currency exchange, unconcealed prostitution and facilitated entry) makes the stay more comfortable, but also creates space for fraudsters and criminals. In this perspective, many problems with trust have an absolutely rational explanation: a large variation in size (Chinese factories use similar names on the European and Chinese scale), misunderstanding associated with the language barrier, and energetic trading style in the markets of north-eastern China can create a sense of Chinese readiness to make money at any cost. The deceptive similarity of the city to Siberian cities played a large role: despite Russian inscriptions, variations of Russian cuisine and Russian music in restaurants, Chinese standards, certificates 1 There are stories that in Manchuria, they "palm off" under-age prostitutes and then bring the police. The lack of examples of foreigners criminally punished for contacting minors in the region did not stop the storytellers. and procedures for providing medical care are significantly different. Together with the language barrier, it created a sense of poor quality that could not compensate for low prices. The fever of the border town also played a certain role: many service centres took on any order (without following the procedures or without any qualifications). In this perspective, most of what is called deception is a misunderstanding, a different emotion of selling, attempts to keep the customer at all costs, and of course mediocre attempts to deceive "rich" Russians.
Though the biggest objective problem clearly lies on the side of the guests: it is balancing of Russian businessmen between the fear of losing and the hope of earning money in the space the feelings of danger and anxiety were projected into. The fear of losing makes you look for your Chinese, the hope of earning creates distrust and suspicion that your Chinese offer unreal prices. This creates an insoluble contradiction between the attempt to solve problems through acquainted Chinese and the search for "real Chinese prices" hidden from Russian entrepreneurs by new Chinese friends (lack of confidence in the ability to organize access to the cheapest prices). At the same time, these strategies strengthened determination of the Chinese sellers -knowing that guests from Russia would always be unhappy they sought to sell goods by any means. It can be assumed that it is not so much the problems that guests from Russia have to solve, but the ways to read them that are unique. Universal problems of border trade were formulated in a dictionary of distrust towards people, the city and border localization.
The Chinese and Russians agree that in Manchuria one may encounter dishonest trade and aggressive behaviour, but this is explained by different reasons and in completely different perspectives. For the Chinese, cases of deception are a fixable and temporary consequence of the wonderful opportunity to earn money for a large number of people. The priority of development over security and consent to a certain grey zone in the first phase of creating an economic centre formed the image of a city of success and neoliberal hope for success. Therefore, the region has long perceived The above example shows a reputational problem directly related to trust in an antagonistic cultural environment. Reputation helps participants of the exchange to reduce information costs and risks associated with acquiring low-quality goods or 1 One of my respondents, the Chinese Mongolian Chingiz, said that the Russians did not notice the drama of the Mongols from mixed families: "I am a Mongolian with a Chinese face, this is difficult. It is good that the Russians do not notice this." It may be noted that Chingiz consciously or unconsciously differed from the Chinese "helpers." He was more restrained, tactful and calm, which was noted by his Russian clients as positive features related to the fact that he is not Chinese. agreeing to higher prices. But its creation in a situation of mass distrust requires the emergence of a fictitious small community of good Chinese, allowing guests of the city to implement economic strategies without abandoning the alarming frame of perception of the city. As was shown above, it was a trap that paradoxically reinforced the disturbing perception of the city. In this perspective, the problem of trust is unsolvable, since each new decision gives rise to a new round of mistrust. The combination of anxious perception of the place and the market-city with quite aggressive strategies for finding real prices led to a constant spiral of frustration and mistrust. Spatial projections and fear of the Chinese craftiness turned out to be stronger than the idea of a cross-border machine of economic growth in the region.
Conclusion
China implements a model of reforms, in which the features of transitional society are preserved for an unlimited period (Naughton, 2007) , but the social responsibility of the state is consistently transferred to the area of private responsibility of citizens (Bhalla, Shufang Qiu, 2010) . This creates a field for hybrid strategies for the development of border areas, when the goal of the state policy is not only the modernization of industrial structures, but also the orientation of border areas towards the Russian and Siberia turned out to be more dangerous for Manzhouli than for the Siberian regions.
The inability to implement the city's declaration of trust and friendship also played a significant role in the decline of the city. Long before the serious economic problems of Russia, Manzhouli was described as a space of deception and aggression. In addition to the objective reasons listed in the article that are related to the peculiarities of trade in terms of subjective extraterritoriality, the main reason was the triple disagreement of Russian clients: with the border city shop-window of Chinese success, with the market-city and with the creation of a border pole of development. Despite the real and rather positive experience of contacts, public representations of the city of friendship and trust were subordinated to the difficult process of adaptation of the residents of Russia to the end of the Russian century in this part of Asia.
The article shows that, in addition to the objective criteria, subjective factors associated with the experience of the Russian colonial policy and the legacy of the smooth infrastructure of the Soviet border, as well as the rejection of the manifestation of success in the former Russian territory play a significant role in choosing a convenient place of trade and leisure. In this perspective, the marginalization of Manzhouli is derived from the existing consensus of the priority of the post-Soviet security perspective over the idea of creating a joint machine of economic growth in the region.
It can be assumed that the success of cooperation at the new stage of development of the Siberian regions will require rethinking of the existing spatial (periphery that is dependent on the centre), border (protection from Chinese migrants) and economic (impossibility of good cooperation) mythologemes of the post-Soviet consciousness.
